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NOTE

THE SUIT OF ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS:
CAN ITS EXISTENCE BE JUSTIFIED TODAY?

I. INTRODUCTION
The law of torts is based on the protection of personal and
property interests, both tangible and intangible.' Included in this
concept is the idea that an individual's relational interest deserves
protection. 2 This relational interest is defined as a plaintiff's
position relative to one or more third persons, and most
conspicuously involves the family relation. 3 This relational tort
principle has spawned the action of alienation of affections, a
common law grievance that has come under increasing attack in
this century. 4 Despite the controversy surrounding the action, its /
validity has been upheld in two recent appellate court decisions 5
and the action itself continues to linger in many state statutes,
6
including that of North Dakota.
An action for alienation of affections allows a spouse or a child
to sue a third party for intentional interference with the marriage
relationship. Alienation actions are allowed only if there is a valid
marriage.7 The defendant in the action can be any individual who
1. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORiTS S 124 (4th ed. 1971).

2. Seegenerally Greene, RelationalInterests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460 (1935).
3. See generally Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, U. ILL. L. FORUM 493 (1962). See also
Pound. Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1916).
4. See.generally Feinsinger, LegislativeAttack on Heart Balm, 33 MICH. L. REV. 979 (1935).
5. Wvman v. Wallace, 91 Wash. 2d 317, 588 P.2d 1133 (1979); Bearbower v. Merry, 266
N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978).
6. N.D. CENT. ConE 5 14-02-06 (1971).
7. Van Ellen v. Meyer. 207 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Iowa 1973).
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interferes, including a parent or other relative of the injured spouse
or child. In addition to allowing the injured party to seek
compensatory damages for loss of consortium, 8 most courts allow
collection of exemplary damages. 9 The power to enact such statutes
is derived from the state's police power to provide for the general
welfare,' 0 and more specifically inheres in the state's interest in
maintaining a stable marital relationship. I
Although public perception of the significance of this interest
has not declined, the existence of the tort in many jurisdictions is
being questioned today. The tort has generated controversy from
those who feel that the social utility served by the suit does not
outweigh the harm it engenders. The criticism has also been aimed
at the outdated nature of the action in contrast to the noticeable
liberal change in American social values and personal attitudes in
the last half of this century. Judicial perception of the merit of such
statutes has also been eroded in light of the increased emphasis on
privacy rights found in a long line of cases during the last decade.
It is the purpose of this note to examine the merits of the action
for alienation of affections. After discussing the development of the
action from its origins in the common law of England to the
present, the advantages and disadvantages of the action will be
weighed in an attempt to determine the ultimate utility of the action
today.
II. HISTORICAL

BASIS

The action for alienation of affections developed as one of
three torts involving interference with the marital relationship. 12
The earliest of these actions, variously called abduction or
enticement, 13 developed from the early writ of ravishment which
was available to the husband when his wife was taken from him. 14
The gist of the action for abduction is the physical separation of the
8. Consortium is defined as "societv, companionship, conjiugal affections, fellowship and
assistance." Rott v. Goehring, 33 N.D. 413. 422, 157 N.W. 294. 296 (1916) (citing Adams v.
29 N.E. 792. 793 (1892)).
M1in. 3 Ind. App. 232, __
9. See Tice v. Mandel, 76 N.W.2d 124, 132-33 (N. I). 19)56). Contra, Siegall %. Solomon. 19 III.
2d 145, 166 N.E.2d 5 (1960). Punitive daniages are allowed when detendant's conduct is willtil,
wanton or malicious. Sebastian v. Kluttz. 6 N.C. App. 201. 220. 17(1 S.E.2d 104, 116 (1969).
166 N.E.2d 5. 8 (1960).
10. Siegal] v. Solomon, 19 II. 2(1 145. __
II. Id.
12. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 124 at 874 (4th ed. 1971).
13. See Humphrey v. Pope, 122 Cal. 253, 256. 54 P.847. 848 (1898). 3 RESTATEWINT (SECoNI)
OF TORTS § 684. Besides the tort of abduction, the Restatetment also lists criminal conversation and
it' Marriage Relatiot." Abduction and
with
alienation of affections under "Interference
enticement art used interchangeably.
14. P. WINFIEt.o, LAW OF TORT 234 (5th ed. 1950).
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spouses, whether through force or persuasion.1 5 The action was
first recognized in 1745 in the case of Winsmore v. Greenbank 16 in
which a husband was allowed an action against one who
intentionally "persuaded, procured, and enticed" his wife to leave
the home. This common law action for abduction or enticement
was well received in this country and was adopted by every state
except Louisiana. 1 7 Curiously, the tort of abduction seemed to
disappear from the American legal scene around the turn of the
century. This change was due perhaps to the strong ties the suit had
with the outdated concept of the husband's proprietary interest in
his wife. 18 The result is that the action for abduction appears to
have been engulfed by the more modern action of alienation of
affections. 19
The second tort involving protection of the marriage relation is
criminal conversation. The basis of this action is adultery between
the defendant and the plaintiff's spouse. 20 The plaintiff is entitled to
recover damages for emotional distress and for defilement of the
marriage resulting from the defendant's illicit sexual relations with
the other spouse . 2 The action is harsh in that the only two defenses
available to the defendant are the plaintiff's consent and the statute
of limitations. 2 2 The social utility served by this action has been
questioned in the last thirty years, and some courts have abolished
23
it judicially.
The last of the three actions, alienation of affections, is the
usual remedy today for intentional interference with the marital
relationship. 24 Although the tort has never been formally
recognized in England, 25 it received a favorable response in the
15. King %. Hanson, 13 N.D. 85, 99 N.W. 10185 (1914). The term "abduct" is derived from tie
L.atin 'ab-duto" meaning to lead away. Id. at 99. 99 N.W. at 1088. For an illustration of
"enticement" seePlace v. Searle, 2 K.B. 497 (1932).
16. Willes 577, 125 Eng. Rep. 1330 (1745).
17. Louisiana rejected the action judicially. For North Dakota's version of this action seeN.D.
CENT. CoDE § 14-02-06(1971).
18. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 124 at 874 (4th ed. 1971).
19. See Tice v. Mandel, 76 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1956). In their opinions, courts have substituted
one tor for the other without regard to the wording of the statute. Technically, however, there is a
difference between abduction and alienation of affections in that the plaintiff is not required to prove
physical separation of the spouses in an alienation action, Despite this difference, the North Dakota
cotrts tontiiue to state that the action is one for alienation, when in fact the statute only allows an
action for abduction or enticement. For a clear statement of the difference between the two torts see3
R F:ST,srtF1NT (SEcOD) OF TORTS §§ 683-84 (1976).
20. Giltner v. Stark, 219 N.W.2d 700, 704-05 (Iowa 1974).
21. Vaughn v. Blackburn, 431 S.W.2d 887. 889 (Ky. 1968).
22. Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128. 130 (Iowa 1978); Comte v. Blessing, 381 S.W.2d
780, 788 (Mo. 1964).
23. See,e.g., Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147 (1976).
24. Today, many courts use the word enticement as a substitute for alienation of affections. See
Anderson v. Sturm, 209 Or. 190, __
303 P.2d 509, 510(1956).
25. (;iitliel ,. (leiser, I Q B. 267 (1958).
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United States after being first recognized in New York in 1866.26
The action can be brought against anyone who disrupts the
marriage, including a parent or relative of either spouse. The suit is
also available to a child, who may sue for injuries caused by the
27
alienation of one of his parents.
The interests to be protected in an alienation of affections
action coincide with the protected interests in actions for criminal
conversation and abduction, and are embodied in the term
"consortium." These consortium rights originated from a master's
quasi-proprietary interest in his servant. 2 8 Since at common law the
wife was considered to be a valuable servant, the master's quasiproprietary interest was expanded to include loss of the wife's
services as well. 29 Gradually, courts shifted their emphasis from the
tangible loss of services to the more intangible deprivation of other
elements of the marriage.3 0 These include loss of the society,
companionship, conjugal affections and fellowship of the other
31
spouse.
At early common law, a wife had no identity separate from her
husband.3 2 As a result, she had no separate property right and thus
no protectible interest in the services of her husband. Since the
actions for intentional interference with the marriage were at one
time based on the concept of services, the wife was effectively
precluded from bringing an action at early common law. 33 As
courts modernized their conception of protectible marital interests,
they recognized that the wife should also be able to sue to protect
her interest. 34 This actionable right was recognized by the North
Dakota Supreme Court in the case of King v. Hanson,35 in which it
26. Heermance v..ames, 47 Barb. 120 (N.Y. 1866).
27. Wrangham v. Tebelius, 231 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1975). Many state courts have denied suits
b\ children for the alienation of a parent on the theory that a child had no such cause of action at
Carly common law. Seealso Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d 454. 190 P.2d 984 (1948). See also
Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 176. 56 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1949). On the whole, there does not
appear to be any valid reason why the action should be limited to adults since a child will also feel the
effects of the marital disruption.
28. W. PROSSER. THE LAW OF TORTS § 124 at 873 (4th ed. 1971). The husband was said to have
a personal and exclusive right in the person of his wife. The wife was essentially the "property" of
the husband, SeeTinkerv. Colwell. 193 U.S. 473, 481 (1904).
29. Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462 (1620).
30. See Lippman. The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 CALI. L. REV. 651 (1930): Holbrook. The
Chanlr in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 Mtit. L. REV. 1 (1923).
:il. Rott v. Gohring. 33 N.D. 413. 157 N.W. 294 (1916). Some courts have included financial
support as an element of consortium. Fischer v. Mahlke, 18 Wis. 2d 429, 118 N.W.2d 935 (1963).
The loss or impairment of any of the elements will support an action for alienation of affections.
Edgren v. Reissner. 239 Or. 212. 396 P.2d 564 (1964).
32. Dufies v. Duffies. 76 Wis. 374. 376, 45 N.W. 522. 523 (1890).
33. King v. Hanson, 13 N.D. 85. 99 N.W. 1085 (1904)..For an interesting historical treatment
ofthis subject. seeDuffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N.W. 522 (1890).
34. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 159, 23 N.E. 17 (1889) Seealso,]aynes v.Jaynes. 39 Hun. 40
(N.Y. 1886).
35. 13 N.D. 85. 99 N.W. 1085 (1904).

NOTE

243

was held that the wife should have a cause of action for violation of
her personal right when her husband was enticed from her, since
the wife could no longer be considered as a chattel of her spouse. 36
This judicial construction supplemented the passage of Married
Women's Property Acts by many state legislatures in the late 19th
century. 7 These acts granted to women the same rights to own
property as men already had.
Once the woman's right to sue was recognized, the evolution
of the action for alienation of affections was essentially complete.
This recognition of the wife's right to own property was tied to the
concept that the wife now had a protected interest in the services of
her husband, as the husband had always had in her. In part, it is
this concept of a mutual "property interest" in the services of the
respective spouses that has subjected the action for alienation of
affections to the criticism that the tort is an anachronism.
III. ALIENATION

OF

AFFECTIONS

The primary element of the tort of alienation of affections is
the purposeful alienation of one spouse's affections from the other,
in derogation of that spouse's legally protected marital interests."
The act of the defendant must be purposeful. An actual intent to
alienate, however, is not necessary if the defendant's acts are
inherently wrong and seductive. 39 Generally four things must be
proved in order for the plaintiff to prevail: (a) the existence of the
marriage at the time of alienation, (b) wrongful conduct by the
defendant with the plaintiff's spouse, (c) the loss of affection or consortium, and (d) a casual connection between the defendant's conduct. and the deprivation of consortium. 40 Though the interest
being vindicated is the same as that involved in criminal conversation, it is not imperative in the suit for alienation that the plaintiff
36. Id. at !7,99 N.W.at 1088.
37.3ee, e.gj., North Dakoi, (;Cnturv ('od

section 14-07-05, whihIi silits as fillows:

The wife after marriage has with respect to property, contracs, and iortstih
sarne capacity and rights and is subi'cit
to the sarne liabilities as Iblirc itarriage.

inCluding liability to suitby her husband. In all a( ions by or against her, she shall so,
and I)vso'd in her owsn name.
N.D.CF.xT. COiF § 14-07-05 (1971).
38. 3 RKSTATEIENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 683 (1976). The Restatement has eliminated the word
"Consortium" due to ambigu ityand has substitu ed the particular in terests invaded. Id. C mment C

at 478. For a discussion of the featuresof the action, seeBrown, TheAction.for Alienation (fAffctions, 82
PA. L. RFv. 472, 474-78(1934).
39. Tice %. Mandel, 76 N.W.2d 124, 130 (N.D. 1956). (,'f Kelsey-Seybold Clinic v. M lay,
466 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. 1971). The defendant's actions must be the controlling cause of'lhe
resulting alienation. Bishop v. Glazenr, 245 N.C. 592, 596, 96 S,.E.2d 870, 873 (1957).
40. Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 129 (Iowa 19 78 );,Jones %,.Williams, 247 S.C. 100,
_
145 S. E.2d 683, 684 (1965).
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supply proof of sexual relations between the spouse and the
defendant. 4 1 Unlike the suit for abduction, the plaintiff in an
alienation action can recover even through the spouses have
4 2
remained together.
The action for alienation of affections proceeds on the
assumption that a perfectly harmonious marital relationship has

been divided by a scheming intruder. As a consequence, there is a
presumption of affection between husband and wife in either
spouse's action for alienation. 43 Because the law further presumes
that there is always a possibility of reconciliation between the
husband and wife, under the majority view the plaintiff may be
successful in his action even when there is no affection between the
spouses. 4 4 These presumptions leave the defendant with a difficult

burden. Nevertheless, several defenses can be raised. The
defendant will be exonerated if he can show that he was not
responsible for the alienation, 4 5 or that the plaintiff consented to the
defendant's actions in interrupting the marriage. 46 Other defenses
exist when the straying spouse voluntarily gives his or her
affections4 7 absent encouragement by the defendant and, under the
minority view, when the defendant can show there was no love
between the spouses. 48 Nor will the defendant be liable if he did not
know of the existence of the marriage, or if the statute of
limitations has run.4 9 In the situation where the defendant is a
parent of one of the spouses, the defendant is accorded the privilege
of advising and protecting his or her children and the plaintiff can
recover only where the interference is malicious.50 Thus, if the
advice was given in good faith, no cause of action is available.,
These standards reflect the law's protection of the affections present
in the parent-child relationship as well as the marital relationship.5 2
41. Nabors v. Keaton, 216 Tenn. 637, 640, 393 S.W.2d 382, 383 (1965). Requiring proof of
sexual relations would of course virtuallv eliminate actions against parents or other relatives.
42. Alaimo v. Schwanz, 56Wis. 2d 198, 201. 201 N.W.2d 604. 606 (1972). See alsoJ. MAr)Is.N,
PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 166 (1931).

43. Allen v. Lindeman, 259 Iowa 1384, 1387. 148 N.W.2d 610, 613 (1967). See aLso Feinsinger.
Lejislative Attack on "Heart Balm, " 33 MICH. L. REV. 979, 995 (1935).
44. Gibson v. Gibson, 244 Ark. 327.
424 S.W.2d 871. 874 (1968).
45. Poulos v. Poulos, 351 Mass. 603,
222 N.E.2d 887, 890 (1967).
46. Comtesv. Blessing. 381 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo. 1964).
47. Archer v. Archer. 31 Tenn. App. 657. __,
219 S.W.2d 919. 921 (1947). Contra, Chestnut
v. Sutton. 207 N.C. 256, 176 S. E. 743 (1934).
48. Booth v. Krause, 78 Ohio App. 461.
-, 65 N.E.2d 89, 92 (1946). The majority position
is that the absence of affection will only mitigate damages. Wilson v. Hilske. 132 Vt. 506, 1508,
321
A.2d 16, 18 (1974). This majority view is consistent with the presumption of the possibility of
reconciliation between the spouses.
49. Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Iowa 1978).
50. Acchione v. Acchione, 376 Pa, 36, 101 A.2d 642 (1954).
5I..Jefferson v. Kenoss, 38 Cal. App. 496, 101 P.2d 711 (1940).
52. Koehler v. Koehler, 248 Iowa 144. 79 N.W.2c 791 (1956). Accord, Carrieri v. Bush, 69
Wash. 2d 536, 419 P.2d 132 (1966).
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The damages recoverable for interference with the marriage
relationship were once limited to the value of the wife's lost
services.1 3 Recognition by the courts, however, of more intangible
rights deserving of protection has broadened the .scope of damage
awards and caused an increase in the amounts awarded. 54 Damages
today may be given for lost comfort, love, companionship, and
support. 55 Modern awards also compensate such injuries as mental
anguish, loss of social position, humiliation, and pecuniary loss due
to disruption of the marriage. 56 Most states also allow punitive
damages when it appears the defendant's conduct was willful or
wanton. 57
The action for alienation of affections has existed in North
Dakota since its enactment by statute in 1895. The law provides
that "the rights of personal relation forbid: the abduction or
enticement of a husband from his wife, or the abduction or
enticement of a wife from her husband." 58 Although the statute
gives a right of action for enticement or abduction, all the cases
reported under the statute have been brought for alienation of
affections. 59 It therefore appears the two torts have merged under
the action for alienation of affections.
The elements of the action in North Dakota accord generally
with those in other states. There must be wrongful conduct of the
defendant, loss of consortium, and a causal connection between
such conduct and loss. 6° North Dakota courts have not required
proof of abandonment, 6 1 and have further held that the plaintiff's
separation from his or her spouse prior to the interference by the
defendant will not defeat the action. 62 Both compensatory and
53. Curry v. Kline, 187 Kan. 109, 353 P.2d 508 (1960). Since the wife had no cause of action at
carly common law, damages recovered from wrongs done to the wife belonged not to her, but to her
hushand. Duffies v. Duffies. 76 Wis. 374, __ .45 N.W. 522. 523 (1890).
54. Gilter v. Stark. 219 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa 1974) (award of $60,000): Turner v. Turner. 369
S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (award of$ 179,000).
55. Morev %v.Keller. 77 S.1). 49, 85 N.W.2d 57 (1957).
56. Donnell \. Donnell, 220 Tenn. 169. 179,415 S.W.2d 127, 132(1967).
57. See.e.g'.. Giltner v. Stark. 219 N.W.2d 700, 708 (Iowa 1974). For an example of a state
statute that precludes recovery ol punitive damages weIt. REv. STAT. ch. 68 §§ 34-44 (Smith-Hurd
1959).
58. N.D.R.C. § 2718 (1895). The recent codification is found in N.D. CF.NT. CODE § 14-02-06
(1971).
59. See Tice v. Mandel, 76 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1956). See also King v. Hanson. 13 N.D. 85, 99
N.W. 1085 (1904), in which the court discusses the meaning ofabduction but at the same time makes
clear that the suit is for alienation of affections. Although a merger of the two actions max simplifv'
this ara of tort law, it must be remembered that the proof requirements are slightly different in that
a suit for abduction requires proofthat the spouses have separated while an action for alienation does
not. Higham s. Vanasda, 101 Ind. 160 (1884): Alaimo v. Schwazn. 56 Wis. 2d 198. 201. 201
N.W.2d 604. 606 (1972).
60. 76 N.W.2d at 129.
6l. Id. at 126.
62. Rott v. Goehring. 33 N.D. 413. 422. 157 N.W. 294. 296 (1916).
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exemplary damages can be awarded.

63

It is significant to note that the North Dakota statute gives a
cause of action for alienation of affections to a child for the
alienation of his parent, and to a parent for the alienation of his
child. 64 The parent's cause of action was derived from the common
law which held liable anyone who abducted a child, enticed a child
away, or harbored a child who had left home against the wishes of
the parent. 65 The child's right to bring suit has received less
approval from the courts, due in part to the denial of the child's
right to bring the action at common law. 66 North Dakota is one of
the few states that statutorily recognizes the child's right of action
today. The action can be brought by a child against one who
intentionally alienates the parent from the child. In an action by a
parent or a child the proof requirements are the same as those in the
action between adults. The interest to be protected is the loss of
love, affection, and companionship, and damages may be
67
recovered for mental anguish and distress.
The tort of alienation of affections has been well received in
this country as a redress for marital disruption. The action has been
brought frequently in many states, due perhaps to the relative ease
with which a plaintiff can sustain his burden of proof, the
presumptions available to him, and the tendency towards liberality
in fixing compensation. Yet, the popularity of the action and the
meritorious interests the action purports to protect do not
overshadow the harm caused by the action. This conclusion is best
reflected by the trend toward abolishment in other states.
IV. NATIONAL TREND
Despite its initial positive reception in this country, the action
for alienation of affections has come under scathing attack in this
reiovered S5.000 compensatory dantages and $10,000
63. 76 N.\V.2d at 135. Plaintiiff
XtI1 1plarv damnages - lat reduc d It S7,50). I)amages covered lios of' Iovc anld consorttum,.
l)hysical Pain. mential agony. laerated ti'elings, wounded scrisilititics. humiliation. bilow to honor.
lif', andtsspicion csMoniffsping, Id a1 128.
hurt to fhinil
64. N.D. C(NT. Coio v 14-02-06 (1971).
65. See Strode v. Glason, 9 \wash. App. 13. 510 P.2d 250 (1973). The pIlaintiffi must generally
. 510 P.2d at 252.
show loss of" tie scrvices and 'ustody oflthe child in order to recover. Id. it __
66. Nash v. Baker. 522 P.2d 1335 (Okla. 1974).
67. Wrangham v. Tcctelius. 231 N.W.2d 753 (N.I). 1975). fl'ran,/ham involved an appeial front
contpensa toy and pnitive damtages for
a trial court decision allowing two ttrino daughters tocol'lect
the alienation o(f heir inother's allttiOls. Tit, North Dakota Stprete Court granted the defcndant
Iti irect tstiltttny of'dalliage to the diutghters. Id at 757. The right of
; new trial because there %'';Is

a child to sue has been denied in ttany jirisdirtions. For ;in excellent discussion of whether this right
ofAffclions. A Cild's Rti.ht to Seek Dama 'e for Alienation of
should exist seeComittent. Torts: Alienation
His Parents'Affection, 28 OKiLA. L. RFtv. 198 (1975). See l o Whitcomb v. Huffington. 180 Kan. 340.
304 P.2d 465 (1956) (holding thatthe action otnbehalfof'a child should not exist). Contra. Russiok v.
Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D.Mich. 1949).
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century. The apparent failure of the action to strengthen the
marital relationship, along with its ever present potential for
abuse, 6 8 prompted Indiana to become the first state to legislatively
abolish the action. 69 That same year New York also legislatively
abolished the tort.7 0 Prior to these enactments, Louisiana had
become the first state to judicially refuse to recognize the action. In
Moulin v. Monteleone,7 the Louisiana court reasoned that since
marriage was a civil contract and since the Louisiana Civil Code
did not recognize a right of action arising out of breach of that
contract, there could be no recovery. 7 2 The court further rejected
the action by reasoning that the damages are mainly punitive and
that the action should thus fall within the realm of criminal rather
73
than civil law.

After the initial wave of reform in the 1930's, the crusade
against the action lost its momentum temporarily. Momentum was
regained in the last two decades, aided by adverse publicity
concerning alienation actions and a recognition of the serious
abuses produced by the suit.7

4

To date, twenty-five states have

abolished the action for alienation of affections. 7 5 Twenty of these
enactments have taken place within the last fifteen years.
The policy statement in the preamble to Florida's statute is
indicative of the current general antipathy towards the action:
Whereas, the remedies provided for by law for the
enforcement of action based upon alleged alienation of
affections have been subjected to grave abuses, causing
68. IND. CODE ANN.5 34-4-4-1 (Burns Supp. 1973) These criticisins were mentioned in the
preamble of the statute.
69. 1935 IND. ACTS ch. 208.
70. 1935 N.Y. LAwsch. 263. The New York law was signed only ten days after the Indiana law.
71. 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927).
72. Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 178, 115 So. 447, 451 (1927).
73. Id. at 171, 115 So. at 448. The court also failed to find a cause of action based on natural law
as opposed to positive law. Id. at 194, 115 So. at 456.
74. Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Iowa 1978).
75. ALA. CODE § 6-5-311 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-341 (Supp. 1979); CAL. CtV.
CODFE § 43.5 (West 1954); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52572t:(West Supp. 1979); DEL . CooE ANN. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West
1964): GA, Coo ANN. § 30-109.1 (CuM. Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-4-1 (Burns Supp.
1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19§ 167 (Supp. 1979); MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5301 (1974); MICH. COIP. LAws ANN. § 600.2901 (1968); MINN. STAt. ANN. § 553.01 (West 1980);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-1201 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.380(1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.
2A: 23-I (West 1952); N. Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §80-a (McKinney 1976); OHIO REV. CODEANN.
2305.29 (Page Supp. 1979); OKLA, STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT.
30.840(1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001 (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 8.01-220 (1977); W. VA.
ConE § 56-3-2A (Supp. 1979); WIs. STAT. ANN. 248.01 (West Supp. 1979); and Wvo. STAT. § 123-101 (1977).
Five states restrict the action in some way. ARK. STAT. ANN.

§ 37-201 (Supp. 1979) (one year

statute of limitations); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 34-44 (Smith-Hurd 1959) (only actual damages
can be recovered); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48. 5 170 (Purdon 1965) (action abolished only against
strangers); R. 1. GEN. LAWS S 9-1-14 (Supp. 1978) (one year statute oflimitations); TENN. CODE
ANN. 28-305 (1956) (three year statute of limitations).
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extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and
pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent and
free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the victim of
circumstances, and such remedies having been exercised
by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment and
such remedies having furnished vehicles for the
commission or attempted commission of crime and in
many cases have resulted in the perpetration of frauds,
exploitation and blackmail, it is hereby declared as the
public policy of the State of Florida that the best interest
of the people of the State will be served by the abolition of
76
such remedies.
Despite such reasoning, the remedy of abolition is not always a
popular one, and criticisms have been loud. Statutes such as
Florida's have been found objectionable on the grounds that they
are unconstitutional in that a marriage is a contract, and that
denying the action impairs the obligation of contracts." It has
further been claimed that marital rights are property rights which
cannot be abrogated without denying due process. 7 8 These
arguments have been rejected by several state courts. 7 9
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held that
marriage is not defined as a contract within the constitutional
prohibition preventing states from impairing the obligation of
contracts.8 0 Modern thought also dismisses the idea that either
spouse has a property interest in the other through the marital
bond. 81
Although judicial abolition of the action has been infrequent,
a partial step recently has been taken by a Washington appellate
76. FL. STAT. ANN. 5 771.01 (West 1964).

77. See,e.g.,Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E.2d 47(1937). The court upheld the
constitutionality of the New York statute which abolished the action for alienation of affections
reasoning that a marriage resembled an institution more than it did a contract, and that the
husband's rights to the wife's affections were not "property" within the due process clause of the
fifth amendment.
78. Id. at 25. 8 N.E.2d at 48. This argument is based on the cmmn-law co0cept that the rights
which a husband had in the affection and society of his wife were frequently considered a property
right. See Foot v. Card. 58 Conn. 1.18 A. 1027 (i889).
79. Se, e.g.,Bunten v. Bunten. 15 N.J. Misc. 532. 192 A. 727 (1937) (statute abolishing action
constitutional): Nicholson v. Han. 12 Mich. App. 35. 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968). Contra, Heck v.
Shupp. 394 Ill.296. 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946) (invalidated the original Illinois statute abolishing
actions for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and breach of promise to marry because
such repeal was in violation of a state constitutional provision which provided that every person
should have a remedy atlaw tfr all personal injuries).
80. Maynard v-. Hill. 125 U.S. 190(1888).
81. Hanfgarn v.Mark. 274 N.Y. 22.25.8 N.E.2d 47. 48 (1937).
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court. 82 In Wyman v. Wallace,8 3 the court eliminated the action in
cases of extra-marital sexual relations. 84 The court justified its usurpation of legislative power on the ground that it had a duty to
examine and change concepts that were not in line with current
conditions and thinking. 85 The court reasoned that the action was
based on the outdated idea that the wife was one of the husband's
chattels, and that her loss was a property loss to him. 8 6 The court
was also distressed by the humiliation and general negative impact
the action has on young children.8 7 The court further asserted that
the suit diminished human dignity and fails in its general attempt
to prevent human misconduct. 88
On appeal, the action was reinstated by the Washington
Supreme Court in a five to four decision. 8 9 The supreme court felt
that the legislature was better equipped to evaluate such a policy
change. 90 While the supreme court refused to recognize the abuse
potential in the action, it reasoned that even if abuse did exist, the
remedy should not be abolition, but should rather be aimed at the
particular evil which arises. 9' In making this statement, the court
created an excellent opportunity for itself to examine the action
in depth, to analyze these implied evils, and to suggest remedies
other than abolition. Unfortunately, this opportunity was bypassed. The court was also weak in its criticism of the lower court's
action, stating merely that the reasoning behind the lower court's
decision lacked evidentiary support. 92 In light of the narrow
decision, and the failure of the higher court to delineate policy
reasons for retention of the action, the decision can be seen as a
suggestion to the legislative body to eliminate this facet of the
common law in Washington.
V. EVALUATION

OF

THE

ACTION

The issue concerning the retention or elimination of the action
82. Wyman v. Wallace, 15 Wash. App. 395, 549 P.2d 71 (1976). For a discussion of this case see
Comment, Action for Alienation of Affection
of a Spouse Abolird in Wohin.Rron, 12 CONZ. L. R v. .545
(1976-77); seealso Comment, Alienation of Affections. Flourishin, Anachronivm, 13 WAKF FORFST L.
RFv. 585 (1977). One lower state court has recently suggested abolition of the action. SeeThompson
v.Chapman, 5 F.L.R. 2558, cert.
denied, 593 P.2d 1078 (1979).
83. 15 Wash. App. 395,549 P.2d 71 (1976).
84. Id. at 396, 549 P.2d 71 (1976).
85. Id.
86. Id.at 397-98, 549 P.2d at 72 (citing Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 la. 169, 177, 115 So. 447,
450 (1927)).
87. Id. at 400, 549 P.2d at 74.
88. Id. at 401,549 P.2d at 74.
89. Wyman v. Wallace, 91 Wash. 2(1 317,588 P.2d 1133 (1979).
90. Id.at 321, 588 P.2d at 1135.
91. Id at 320, 588 P.2d at 1134.
92. Id.
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is delicate since social and moral questions are attached to the
larger legal one. Involved in the debate are questions relating to the
protection of marriage through legal means, the significance of
marriage as a cornerstone of our society today, contemporary
philosophical attitudes, and questions concerning an individual's
right to seek redress for personal wrongs. All of these factors are
crucial to an adequate discussion of the controversy. Part of the
problem in reaching a viable answer to the utility of the action is
that the issue cannot be stated too narrowly. To phrase the issue in
terms of whether a family member's interest in the harmony of his
or her home is of sufficient magnitude to warrant judicial
protection appears to beg the question. The more relevant inquiry
is to determine the utility of the action based on a consideration of
all the major factors. This can best be accomplished through the use
of a balancing test. This analysis will entail a balancing approach
set up in the framework of three main considerations: the marriage
relation, personal equities, and the right of privacy. Arguments on
both sides will be weighed, and a resolution will be suggested
concerning the utility of the action.
A.

SUPPORT OF THE MARRIAGE RELATION

Marriage is, without question, one of the most treasured
institutions in our society. It has been declared as "one of the basic
civil rights of man, fundamental to our existence and survival. "91
The importance of marriage is most apparent in the social functions
it serves, such as a secure and orderly setting for sexual activity,
procreation, and the socialization of children. As a result of its
exalted position in society, the institution of marriage has always
found favor in the law. 94 One law propagated to secure the
marriage is the suit for alienation of affections. The interests of the
state in maintaining the action arise essentially from the state's
interest in protecting the home and in preserving the marriage,
with the goal of stabilizing family relationships. 9 5 Although
marriage is valued highly in our society, the action for alienation of
affections unrealistically defines the extent of that value, and the
relationship of the marital partners. The marriage, as a union of
individuals, will inevitably encounter discordant moments. Yet,
93. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383
(1978).
94. See Board ofDirs. v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 1269, 147 N.W.2d 854, 859 (1967).
95. See Comment, "Anti-Heart Balm" Leeislation Revisited, 56 N.W.L. R v. 538. 545 (1961).
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the tort proceeds on the fictitious presumption of a perfectly
harmonious spousal relationship destroyed by the thoughtless
intruder. This presumption is misleading in two respects. First,
though the defendant may not be totally blameless, he would ordinarily not be in such a position had the marriage been as strong
and viable as the presumption suggests. As one judge recently
stated, "any third person who kicks at the cornerstone of a shaky
marriage will not bring it down without active support from one or
both of the parties. "96 The second reason why the presumption is
false is that it proceeds from the premise that the enticed spouse has
no individual mind or will, but has allowed himself or herself to be
led astray, to the detriment of the existing marriage. It has been
argued that since all marriages will have rough spots, the marriage
partners should be left alone to work out their problems and that
those who intervene should be liable. 97 This argument, however,
erroneously assumes the total guilt of the third party and the total
innocence of the enticed spouse.
Granting, nevertheless, that the marriage relationship is
deserving of society's protection, the question remains whether the
action actually protects the marriage. The premise that the
existence of the action does help preserve the marital relationship
has never been documented. To the contrary, an analysis of the
action reveals that the suit has just the opposite result. First, public
notice of the action destroys the reputation of both spouses. Even
when there is no sexual misconduct, or when the action is between
relatives, the bringing of the action serves as a public
acknowledgment that the marriage has gone awry. It is unlikely
that this personal embarrassment will strengthen or preserve the
marital bond. Second, the very nature of the action serves as a
destructive influence on the marriage. The action tends to bring
out the worst in people. As stated by one judge, "[a] prime
motivation for bringing the action is often the need of the plaintiff
to vindicate his or her position and justify one's own past
shortcomings." 98 Greed, revenge, spite, and a desire to humiliate
others in sacrifice of one's own dignity seem inherent in the suit.
The plaintiff appears as an individual engaging in self-degradation
by translating marital values into monetary terms. 99 This situation

96. Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2t 128. 138 (Iowa 1978) (McCormick, J.,dissenting in
part).
97. Id. at 132.
98. Wyman v. Wallace. 15 Wash. App. 395, 397. 549 P.2d 71. 73 (1976).
99. 266 N.\V.2d at 138 (McCormick. ..dissenting in part).
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can hardly serve as a constructive influence on preserving a stable
marital relationship between two mature adults. 100
Even if it is argued that the action preserves the marriage, and
that the social good to be derived from marriage outweighs the
harm fostered by the action, it must then be argued that the
presence of the action will deter potential defendants from
interfering with the marriage. Of course, the reality is that the
defendant in a case involving extra-marital sexual relations
becomes enmeshed with the plaintiff's spouse, generally without
preconceived design. 10 1 Certainly in the case of a defendant parent
there may be a motivation to ruin the marriage. However, even in
cases in which such a motive exists, it is unrealistic to argue that the
possible deterrent effect of the action will overcome the defendant's
intent to undermine the marriage.
B.

PERSONAL RECOMPENSE

Whatever effect one concludes the action has on the marriage
relationship, it must be remembered that in an action for alienation
of affections a personal injury also has been suffered. It is a basic
tort law tenet that this personal injury deserves to be redressed. In
the tort of alienation of affections the in jury suffered by the plaintiff
is the loss of consortium along with the mental and physical anguish
fostered by the marital disruption. Certainly, situations exist where
a genuine wrong has been committed which deserves to be
redressed. However, in examining whether the action furthers
equity for individuals, it must be remembered that equity to the
plaintiff is not the only consideration. Whether the action itself
causes unfair and adverse results to defendants and third parties
must also be examined.
One inequitable facet of the alienation tort is the inherent
difficulty in determining liability. In the frequent case today in
which the marriage has gone awry, due in part to the plaintiff's
conduct, the jury in a case involving extramarital sexual relations
has the task of determining the pursuer and the pursued. Such a
decision would be difficult for a trained social scientist, much less
for an impressionable jury in this emotional setting.t0 2 The
100. The action as based on the relational interest is also inconsistent with modern no-fault
divorce laws. Under a no-fault system there is no longer t need to prove fault as a basis for
terminating a marriage. If irreconcilable differences exist. -the divorce will be granted. See N.D.
CENT. ConF S 14-05-03 (1971). In contrast, the tort of aienati6n of affections specifically entails
placing the fault for the marital disruption on another.
101. 15 Wash. App. at 398, 549 P.2d at 74. See also Feinsinger. Leeislative Attack on "Heart

Balm, "33

MicH. L. Rrv. 979, 995(1935).

102. Because of the vagueness of the liability concept in an alienation of affections suit, it is not
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unfairness of the situation is exemplified by cases in which the
plaintiff's separation from the spouse and the spouse's willing
participation in the illicit affair has not prevented the jury from
finding for the plaintiff. 03 By their nature such lawsuits are
susceptible to the inflammatory plea and attitude of the plaintiff
directed toward the scheming defendant, while encouraging the
sympathetic jury to reach a verdict on the basis of passion and
prejudice. Such a scenario has a great potential for injustice.
The plaintiff's right of redress must also be balanced against
the destructive influence of damages in the action. Damage awards
in an alienation of affections suit are difficult to determine, since
intangible injuries are involved. The jury must consider not only
the loss of consortium in setting an award, but also the injuries
done to the plaintiff's health, reputation and mental state. These
damages must in turn be mitigated by the lack of affection between
the spouses, and the unhappy marital relations before the
interference. Because there is no standard of measurement by
which the jury can value these intangible rights, jury verdicts in this
area of the law are frequently arbitrary and excessive. 10 4 These
excessive awards are especially unjust in the many cases where the
plaintiff sues not out of a desire to mend the already torn marriage,
but for vindictive and mercenary reasons.
Weighing heavily against the plaintiff's right of recompense is
the potential for abuse in the action and the harmful effect the tort
has on innocent people. The injuries suffered from the publicity of
such a suit can frequently outweigh the injury that caused the
action. Since there exists such potential to damage reputations, the
threat to sue can easily become, in effect, an extortion scheme.
These abuses are especially prevalent in divorce settlements where
the threat of suit may serve as a powerful leverage for the potential
plaintiff in obtaining a disproportionate share of the marital
property. The action also leaves open the possibility of collusion between the husband and wife to trap a wealthy but unwary defendant. Naturally, in this situation there is immediate reconciliation of
the spouses after the settlement. Finally, the effect of bringing an
alienation of affections action can be detrimental to family hardifICult to visualize a scenario where two lawsuits arise from every romantic affair, with the
romantically involved pair both having to defend in the suits.
103. See, e.g., Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 170 S.E.2d 104(1969).
104. See, e.g., Castner v. Wright, 256 Iowa 638, 128 N.W.2d 885 (1964) (award of $45,000
ruled cmcssive); Roach v. Kcane, 73 Wis. 2dl 524. 243 N.W.2d 508 (1976) (award of$10.000 rulhd
c.xcessise): Alaimo v. Schwanz, 56 Wis. 2d 198. 201 N V.2d 604 (1972) (award of$15,000 ruled ex.essiwc).
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mony when an intra-family suit is involved. Ironically, one of the
purported goals of the action is the stabilization of family relationships. The long run cost of bringing the action can also be
devastating in terms of the resulting emotional injury to innocent
children of the marriage. Not only are children exposed to the
parent's extramarital conduct and to turbulent intra-family suits,
but children may also be forced to testify to these matters in court.
This is a psychological cost that must ultimately be shouldered by
society.
C.

RIGHT OF PRIVACY

The third factor to consider in evaluating the action is an
individual's interest in his privacy rights. These privacy rights
consist of an individual's interest in avoiding unwarranted
intrusion into his or her personal activities. 10 5 This includes a
person's right to make fundamental choices involving himself, his
family, and his relationship with others. 0 6 The importance of this
privacy interest is best evidenced by the legal protections afforded
this interest in our society. By intruding on an individual's privacy,
one may find himself liable- in tort for invasion of privacy' 017 under
any one of four general classes. 0 8 This privacy interest has
constitutional significance as well. As a means of individual'
protection from governmental intrusion, the interest has been
recognized as a fundamental right in the last fifteen years. 0 9 The
right to freedom of choice in marriage and family relationships lies
at the heart of this fundamental right of privacy. 110 This privacy
right found fruition in the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 1 in which the Court found a
right of marital privacy inherent in the fourth,. fifth, and ninth
amendments. The Court, in Eisenstadt v. Baird112 construed this
right of sexual privacy to inhere not only in the marriage relationship,
105. Shorterv. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Stpp. 329. 330(1966).
106. Industrial Found. v Texas Inldss. Ace. Bd,. 540 S.\V.2d 668.679 (Tex. 1976).
107. W. PROSSFR.THE LAOFTORTS § 117 (4th. ed. 1971).
108. The first class is "appropriation." which consists of appropriating plaintiff's name or
liken ess for the defendant's benefit. Carlisle v. Fawcett Pub.. 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr.
405 (1962): the second category is "intrusion," which consists of invasion of the plaintiff's solitude or
seclusion. Ford Motor Co. v. Williams. 108 Ga. App. 21. 132 S.E.2d 206 (1963). rel'd on other
grounds. 134 S.E.2d 32 (1963): third is "public disclosure of private facts," consisting of harmful
publicity about a plaintiff's personal activities even though true. Melvin v. Reid. 112 Cal. App. 285.
297 P. 91 (1931): tlie final class is self-explanatory, entitled "false light in the public eye." tzkovitch
v. Whitaker. 115 La. 479. 39 So. 499(1905).
109. See Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generall, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438(1972).
110. Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
111.381 U.S. 479(1965).

112. 405 U.S. 438(1972).
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but to individuals as well. 11 3 Since the privacy right inheres both in
the marriage relationship and in the individual, whether married or
not, it follows that there may also be a privacy right to be protected
when extramarital sexual conduct is the subject of an alienation of
affections suit. 114
Regardless of its constitutional dimensions or its basis in tort
law, the privacy interest in freedom of choice as to emotional and
sexual issues in one's life is important, and the question whether
the alienation of affections action promotes or hinders protection of
that interest is another factor to weigh in determining the utility of
the action." 5 The question is almost rhetorical, since even a
cursory evaluation of the tort makes it apparent that the action
interferes with this interest. The tort undeniably allows society's
intrusion into the emotional and sexual realm of another's life.
Thus, the third factor in the balancing approach applied in this
note, the privacy interest in one's emotional and sexual affairs, is
clearly contravened by the action.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question whether the common law action for alienation of
affections serves a constructive purpose today deserves careful
thought in light of the important personal and societal interests at
stake. These interests, analyzed in a balancing approach, accurately reflect the utility of the alienation action. While the
marriage relation and the family unit certainly deserve protection,
the social harm engendered by the tort, and the actual counterproductive effect of the action on the marriage overshadow these
meritorious goals. Further, the interest in personal redress is
outweighed by the inequitable nature of the action to those
involved, the tremendous potential for unscrupulous schemes, and
113. Id. ,rr]Vs,) State %'. ilhh
r. 242 N.V.2d 348 (Iawa 1976). Ahis is ai r''ii
m ,jil
i h,'ruich
it
individual sexual privacy has )een str-ngthen-rd by the abortion dcisions S lPlann'd Iarenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). (. Ponies v. Ports, 135 N.J.
Super. 50, 342 A.2d 574 (1975).
State statutes prohibiting unnatural sexual condut such as sodorinv, hiwa-v-r. hav. consislililv
been upheld on the ground that the state's compelling interest
in ifhi pritmotion ftIi)oral dh'cincy antl
crime prevention overrides the privacy interest. Do v. Commonwealth's Atty., 403 F. Supp. 1199
(1975), qff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Seeao People v. Hurl, 5 Cal. App.2d 865, 85 Cal. Rptr. 718
(1970).
114. Such a conclusion was reached in Kyle v. Albert, No. 75-101871-)5-2 (Ci. C.P. Bu(ks
County Pa., Mar. 16, 1976), in which a Pennsylvania trial court abolished the acion of criminal
conversation. The court held that thitort of criminal conversation violated in individual's right to
engage in natural arnsensual sexual relationns, and thus violated an individual's c'onstitu tional right
oif privacy. 1d. Althugh sunh reasoning has nt-ver ben applied oaaases f' xtratiarital aliftirs
in
alienation suits, the analysis shoul be' identical since similar interests and conduct ;ire
involved115. This right of privacy analysis is restricted to alienation of; ifl-i tions cases in.,lving extramarital affairs.
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the psychological harm to children when the action is brought.
Finally, even if one argues that the prior interests are balanced,
because the alienation tort has a detrimental effect on privacy
interests, on balance the action cannot be justified. Some change is
necessary in this area of law. One alternative is revision of the
action in a manner that alleviates the destructive aspects of the tort
while still protecting the interests involved. 116 A statute that
eliminates punitive damages and restricts compensatory damages
to actual pecuniary loss would go far towards reducing the normally
exorbitant awards recovered.1 1 7 A statute which also makes proof of
sexual intercourse a necessary element would have the salutory
effect of eliminating some destructive intra-family suits.
Unfortunately, such remedial measures will not significantly alter
the harm fostered by the action. Extortionate demands will not be
reduced, the prejudice to the defendant will not be lessened, and
the determination of liability will not be made easier. Further, the
psychological harm to children will not be lessened. Most
important, the action's destructive impact on the marriage and the
intrusion on privacy rights will not be ameliorated.
The position of advocating abolition is an unpopular one, but
is clearly the most tenable option. 1 8 The marriage relation and the
family unit will rest on a more stable foundation without the
existence of the action. Although a plaintiff will lose his forum in
the case in which there is a genuine wrong, the ultimate impact of
this loss will be insignificant, since "[t]here is good reason to
believe that even genuine actions of this type are brought more
frequently than not with purely mercenary or vindictive
motives." ' 1 9 The trend is perceptible in favor of abolition. Five
state legislatures elimiinated this outdated action last session
2 0 The North Dakota Legislature would be
alone. 1
wise to follow suit
during the next session. Such a move would enhance the goal of
116. See Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm, ' 33 MICH. L. REV. 979 (1935). See also
Note. The Case forRetention of Causes of Action for Intentional Interference with the Marital Relationship, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 426 (1972).
117. For an example of thts type of statute, see ii.. RFv. STAT, ch. 68 §§ 35 & 36 (Smith-Hurd
(1959).
118. Repeal of statqes allowing the action should include repeal of the child's right of action
and elimination of the parent's action fbr the alienation of their children also. Such suits are
susceptible to the same injustices that exist in the action between adults. There is little justification
for retaining the child's cause of action if the adult's cause of action isabolished, since the child may
be used as a pawn for the vengeful parent who may bring an action as the child's next friend. For an
interesting discussion of this issue, see Note. Torts. Alienation of Affections. A Child's Right to Seek
DamagesforAlienation ofHis Parent'sAffection, 28 OKtLA. L. RE.'. 198 ( 1975).
119. W.PRosse.R. THF.LAw OF TORTS § 124 at887 (4th ed. 1971).
120. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. 5 25-341 (Supp. 1979):

1979): MtN.

STAT. ANN. S 553.01 (West 1978):

GA. COOF ANN. § 30-109.1 (Cum.Supp.

OHIO REv. Con. AxN.

1979): ORt.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 8.1 (Supp. 1979).

$ 2305,29 (Page Supp.
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flexibility in our legal system by confronting changing conditions
while meeting the objective of justice.
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